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Pro Se for Defendant/ Appellant

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
G. W Haight
Defendant/Appellant
Vs

Infraction Citation
Case No. CR Ml 0-6294

STATE OF IDAHO
Plaintiff/Respondent.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -I

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
Appeal from the decision of the District Court on appeal from the decision of the
Magistrate's Division of the District Court of the First Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in
and for the County of Kootenai, Barry E. Watson, Magistrate, First Judicial District Presiding.
For the Appellant

G. W. Haight Esq
LAW SERVICE, p.a.
113 7 E Skyline Drive
Coeur d'Alene ID 83814

For the Respondent
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Prosecuting Attorney
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ST ATEMENT OF THE CASE
The facts are the accused was convicted of an alleged violation of L C. 49-808 for failure
to use a turn signal. Preliminary rulings in this case established that the testimony of the traffic
enforcement person who issued the citation (herein the "TEP") would be treated no differently
than the testimony of the accused. In other words the TEP was to be afforded no special
consideration as a purported "expert" witness. Tr. p. 9, II 10-14. Therefore both the testimony of
the TEP and of the accused was on an equal footing and should have been provided equal

II

consideration subject to impeachment. There were no witnesses to corroborate the testimony of
either witness. There was no attempt by the state's attorney to impeach the testimony of the
accused. The TEP was extensively cross-examined. The nature and accuracy of the TEP's
observations were questioned and, in all significant respects, disputed.
ST ATEMENT OF ISSUES
The purpose of this appeal is to determine whether a court of precedent will state
explicitly what the courts below stated implicitly; that is, whether the slightest modicum of
evidence is sufficient to support a criminal conviction beyond a reasonable doubt. Stated another
way, the issue is whether, as the courts below held, any uncorroborated lay testimony, regardless
of its weight and probative value, constitutes "substantial" evidence sufficient to support a
criminal conviction of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
FACTS
Beginning on page 45 of the transcript, Defendant clearly and cogently recited the facts in
his direct testimony.
Defendant began with stating there were a considerable number of discrepancies between
the recollection of the TEP and Defendant's recollection of the events. Defendant testified he first
observed the TEP' s patrol car on the date in question at Milepost 10, a mile from the Northwest
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Boulevard off ramp for Interstate Highway 90. The patrol car was proceeding in a general
easterly direction on Interstate 90, as was Defendant behind another car. There was a car in front
of the patrol car and Defendant was, at that point, in the far right or No. 2 lane as identified in the
proceedings.
After making note of the TEP at Milepost 10, Defendant testified he observed the car in
front of the patrol car merge into the right-hand lane and shortly thereafter the patrol car also
merged into the right-hand lane behind that car. At that point there was no traffic in the left-hand
or passing lane. All the traffic, including the TEP, Defendant, the cars between them and the cars
in front of them were in the No. 2 or right-hand lane proceeding at about 55 miles per hour where
the speed limit was still 70 miles per hour.
From that point on there was at least one vehicle between Defendant and the TEP,
blocking the TEP's view of Defendant's vehicle.
Defendant testified that at that time he signaled a movement of intent to move into the
passing lane because the slow traffic appeared to be exiting onto Northwest Boulevard whereas

Defendant then intended to proceed further east to his home.
At that point the first discrepancy between the recollection of the TEP and that of

Defendant was evident. The TEP testified Defendant moved into the passing lane before the
TEP moved into the No. 2 lane. Tr. p. 22, 11. 9-12. In specifically contradicting that statement of
the TEP, Defendant testified he observed both the vehicle in front of the TEP and the TEP move
into the No. 2 lane, leaving the passing lane free of traffic so Defendant could then move into the
passing lane. Tr. p. 45, l. 17

Tr. p. 46, ll. 7. This, then, was the State's Evidentiary Failure

No. 1.

I

The witnesses agreed, however, that Defendant signaled his movement to the passing
lane. Yet even though the TEP admitted he saw Defendant' first signal to move to the passing
land and also observed several other later signals made after the incident, the TEP could not even
recall the color of Defendant's turn signal light. Tr. p. 29, 11. 24-25 -Tr. p. 30, l. 3. State's

I

I

Evidentiary Failure No. 2.
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Continuing, Defendant testified that once past the vehicle immediately in front of him,
while still in the passing lane, he remembered he wanted to go North to a store, Super 1, to obtain
a product which was out of stock in at the Post Falls location of the same business. Defendant
decided to avail himself of the then nearby Northwest Boulevard exit to go to Super 1.
Defendant forcefully testified, directly contradicting the visually impaired TEP, that
Defendant signaled his movement to the right, just as he had signaled his movement to the left a
few moments previously. State's Evidentiary Failure No. 3. This is the most significant
observation error by the TEP and that upon which the State's entire case is based. Defendant
stated the movement was made after determining that the traffic in the No 2 lane was sufficiently
far behind so the maneuver could be made safely. At that point Defendant had a clear and
unobstructed view of all traffic between Defendant and the TEP.
The TEP testified that the third party vehicle between the TEP and Defend ant, in front
and to the right of which Defendant moved, continued east on Interstate 90. Defendant
specifically disputed that assertion. Defendant testified that the vehicle in question proceeded up
the off ramp after Defendant's vehicle and proceeded to move to the right on the off ramp in front

I

of the TEP and that vehicle turned right onto Northwest Boulevard. Tr. p. 52, 11. 8-16. State's
Evidentiary Failure No. 4. Defendant, of course, turned left onto the Boulevard.

The TEP could remember none of the make, model or color of the third party vehicle in
front of which Defendant moved. Tr. p. 30, ll. 6-13. Defendant recalled that the vehicle was
white. Tr. p. 52, 11 7. State's Evidentiary Failure No. 5.
The testimony of the TEP that the vehicle between Defendant's vehicle and that of the
TEP briefly applied its brakes proved nothing. That reaction could just as well occurred because
the operator of the vehicle saw a turn signal or for any other myriad reasons.
The TEP provided exaggerated and irrelevant testimony to the effect that Defendant
exited the freeway "half way up" the distance between the beginning of the off ramp and a socalled "Jersey" barrier. However, the TEP did not know what were the various distances between
various points on the offramp. Tr. p. 41, II 12-19. Defendant provided precise details on the
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distances and the nature of the off ramp and established that if Defendant had crossed onto the off
ramp "halfway up" Defendant would have been past any pavement and would have had to cross
a ditch and probably hit the "Jersey barrier". Even by the TEP's definition of"halfway up",
Defendant would probably have destroyed the Exit 11 sign that Defendant testified was there
present. Tr. p. 51, l 12

Tr. p. 52, 1 7. The TEP could not recall the presence of the Exit sign

I'

although he testified he often took that exit. Tr. p. 328, 11. 1-22; Tr. p. 30, 11. 16-21. Nor could

I

he recall the number of the exit, which is printed on the sign. State's Evidentiary Failure No. 6.

II
I@

In proceeding up the off ramp in the far left (Northerly) lane of the ramp Defendant

1'11111

I

I

observed that the off ramp divided into three lanes before ending at Northwest Boulevard.
Defendant testified he used his right turn signal to indicate a movement to the middle lane of the
off ramp. The TEP did not acknowledge there were three lanes on the offramp and for the
second time failed to note Defendant's consistent use of his turn signals. Tr. p. 32, 11 5-9. State's

Evidentiary Failure No. 5.

I
I
I
I

Defendant and the TEP agree Defendant used his turn signal to indicate a turn onto
Northwest Boulevard. Tr. p 31, 11. 12-22. They also agree that Defendant used his turn signals to
indicate a movement to the right on Northwest Boulevard. Tr. p. 33 11. 1-5; Tr. p. 48, l 22 - Tr.
p. 49, I 10.

The witnesses seem to agree Defendant used his turn signals to move to the shoulder of
the road when the TEP came up behind him with lights flashing. Tr. p. 33, 1. 24 - Tr. p. 34, l. 4.
In summary, Defendant testified he used his turn signals six times after the TEP and

Defendant came within view of each other. The TEP agreed Defendant used his turn signals four
times before and after the alleged incident, but the TEP claimed that Defendant nonetheless broke

I
I

his habit and arbitrarily chose on one occasion not to use his turn signal. If he were consistent in
his eagerness to enforce the law, the TEP should have, under the rationale of State vs Dewbre,
133 Idaho 663 991 P2d 399 (Idaho App. 1999), cited Defendant for the TEP's failure to see
Defendant signal a lane change on the off ramp.
By way of affirmative defense, Defendant testified that he was always in the habit of

I

I
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consistent and conscientious use ofturn signals: First, he considers it bad manners not to use
signals. Tr. p. 49, I 11-18. Second, Defendant had familiarized himself with the Dewbre decision
more than a decade previously with its extremely broad interpretation of the requirement to use
turn signals or be subject to arrest. Tr. p. 49, 11. 4-10. Finally, and not least of all, Defendant was
clearly aware of the presence of the TEP well prior to any lane changes. Only a fool would
choose to be anything but scrupulous in observation of traffic laws when knowingly followed by a
patrol car.

I
I
I

This should have been a relatively simple case for the traffic court magistrate to rule in
favor of Defendant had there been a proper appraisal of the evidence. There was no underlying
motivation such as in the Dewbre case to do whatever it takes to get the bad guy in a stop that
created other complicating issues. There was no suggestion Defendant was driving under the
influence of any controlled substance. There was no drug paraphernalia or a cast away roach to
complicate matters. This should have been clearly seen and treated as a bad arrest by an

I
I

inattentive person with a faulty memory. The cumulative errors, contradictions and ambiguities in
the TEP' s story are more than offset by the clear, concise and detailed testimony, under oath, of a
witness who has more claim, under the circumstances, to integrity and competence than the
State's witness and one as to whom no impeachment was even attempted by the State. Tr. p. 54,
l. 7 - Tr. p. 56 l. 4.

DISCUSSION
This case presents a classic example of "he said", "she said", with a distinction. The
difference here is that the TE P's version of what he saw is inaccurate because his line of vision
was obscured by another vehicle his vehicle and that of Defendant and the evidence demonstrates
that he was less than observant in several particulars.

If, as in this case, innocent people are to be convicted of crimes they did not commit, the
process by which that occurs needs to be clear so the public understands courts are not entities
designed or elevated to the lofty position of seeking fairness and truth, but rather they are
agencies of the state designed simply to administer certain procedures which often serve no
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purpose than to increase the coffers of the State and those who benefit from such activity.
The problem presented by this case and others like it is not the principles of law articulated
by the courts. The principles to which lip service has been given are correct as often recited.
Rather, it is the actual application of those principles in a manner inconsistent with the plain
language of the rules that leads to misunderstanding by the public and misleads the public. Thus,
the time and resources of many people are wasted. As well, wasting time on procedures where
the outcome is preordained reduces the net profit for the State.
In actual practice, the courts are applying civil summary judgment standards to criminal
proceedings. See Coombs v. Curnow, 148 Idaho 129,219 P.3d 453 (2009)
The typical person, if asked to distinguish between "substantial" and the antithesis thereof
such as "any" is likely to believe the former is different from the latter to the same extent as one
might say a new wooden telephone pole is "substantial" whereas a rotten twig is not so even
though both items are composed of the same material. However, in the administration of the law
Idaho judges do not distinguish between the telephone and the twig or "substantial" and "any".
For a common definition of"substantial", which means considerable in quantity, see the internet
site for the Meriam Dictionary at http: www.merriam-webster.com/dictionarwsubstantial.
Contrast with "any", as explained by the Meriam dictionary to mean "one or some indiscriminately
of whatever kind" set forth at http: /www.merriam-webster.com dictionarwany.
Administration of the law with integrity, rather than with the intent to obfuscate and
mislead, mandates that a traffic court magistrate begin proceedings by announcing to everyone
that:
"Before we begin, you all are advised that under the law as administered here, if the
person who issued you a traffic ticket says you committed the offense, you will be found
guilty of the offense because such testimony, by itself: is substantial and proves guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt. You may testify that you did not commit the offense, but that
will not satisfy your obligation prove that you are innocent unless you can produce in
addition to your testimony."
Criminal Instruction No. 103 presently reads as follows:
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A defendant in a criminal action is presumed to be innocent. This presumption
places upon the state the burden of proving the defendant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt. Thus, a defendant, although accused, begins the trial with a
clean slate with no evidence against the defendant. If, after considering all the
evidence and my instructions on the law, you have a reasonable doubt as to the
defendant's guilt, you must return a verdict of not guilty.
Reasonable doubt is defined as follows: It is not mere possible doubt, because
everything relating to human affairs, and depending on moral evidence, is open to
some possible or imaginary doubt. It is the state of the case which, after the entire
comparison and consideration of all the evidence, leaves the minds of the jurors in
that condition that they cannot say they feel an abiding conviction, to a moral
certainty, of the truth of the charge."
In light of the actual manner in which the law is administered Criminal Instruction No. 103
is misleading, inaccurate and needs to be revised to read as follows:
A defendant in a criminal action is presumed to be innocent. This presumption
places upon the state the burden of proving the defendant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt. Any admissible evidence provided by the state is sufficient to
discharge the State 's burden. The burden then sh(fts to the defendant to prove the
defendant's innocence by admissible evidence that has greater weight than the
evidence provided by the ,State. !he testimony of the defendant denying the
evidence provided by the State is not sufficient to prove the innocence of the
defendant. Thus, while a defendant, although accused, begins the trial with a clean
slate with no evidence against the defendant, any admissible evidence can support
a conviction. If, after considering the state's evidence and my instructions on the
law, you believe the defendant has not proved the defendant innocent, you can
than have no reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt, and you must return a
verdict of guilty. (Italics added).
Reasonable doubt is defined as follows: It is not mere possible doubt, because
everything relating to human affairs, and depending on moral evidence, is open to
some possible or imaginary doubt. It is the state of the case which, after the entire
_-::omparison and consideration of all the evidence as I have just instructed, leaves
the minds of the jurors in that condition that they cannot say they feel an abiding
conviction, to a moral certainty, that the charge is.false."
By providing clear instructions such as these there should be a significant reduction in the
burden on the courts and the State's prosecutors in the administration of criminal laws.
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Particularly in the case of traffic offenses, it should be no problem to establish an on-line series of
questions which, when answered by the defendant in question, will clearly establish for that
defendant that appearing in court will serve no purpose. Ultimately such honesty on the part of
the judiciary could lead to a significant reduction in the cost of administering justice, particularly
in the case of traffic laws, thus improving the net revenue stream for the State. A more efficient
administration of the justice system such as this will have the added benefit of reducing the
public's futile waste of time and its cost for lawyers.
CONCLUSION

In a criminal proceeding it should take more than a feather's weight of testimony to offset
a considerably greater weight of evidence especially where the evidence to convict is seriously
flawed.
While the TEP' s testimony might marginally be sufficient to justify a stop, it hardly
achieved the dignity of"substantial" evidence to support the State's burden to prove guilt beyond
"reasonable" doubt. That is so under any common understanding of those terms. If indeed the
evidence in this case is deemed sufficient to support such a verdict then the time has come for the
courts to suspend giving lip service to "substantial" and "reasonable doubt" and to establish the
clear rule that any admissible evidence is substantial and will satisfy the State's burden to prove
guilt.
Incidentally, it would have been a simple matter for the TEP in this (or any similar case) to
provide corroboration for his testimony by merely turning on his camera, which would also have
allowed the parties an opportunity to identify and interview possible witnesses.

It is respectfully requested that the judgments of the trial court in this matter be reversed
and that judgment be entered in favor of Defendant/ Appellant. Alternatively, it is requested that
the court articulate and publish, without further obfuscation, the actual evidentiary standards for
criminal convictions in Idaho.
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Dated: July 6, 2012.
G. W HAIGHT, Appellant
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I hereby certify that on July 6, 2012 two true and correct copies of the foregoing
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Prosecuting Attorney
501 Government Way
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